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This is a summary of the open discussion on future research topics for symmetric
cryptography chaired by Stefan Lucks. During this session participants were
suggesting topics of potential future interest. Here is the list of spotted topics.
The first four were seen as somewhat more important, the rest are shown in the
order they we called out.
Leakage Resilience: to offer protection against attacks that exploit leakage in
implementations, one can design primitives, modes and protocols so that such
leakage can either not be exploited or does not result in a compromise of security.
Beyond Birthday Security: the most widely used block ciphers have a block size
of 128 bits (AES and most of its clones) or even 64 bits (Triple DES, IDEA
and numerous so-called lightweight ciphers). As soon as the number of blocks
processed with a block cipher with a given key approaches the square root of
the domain size (264 in the case of AES, 232 in the case of DES), input collisions
become likely and (distinguishing) security of breaks down for most modes. Some
think that this should be addressed by having modes for which security would
not break down at that point.
Lightweight Crypto: the participants at the discussion agreed that lightweight
crypto should not be considered a single homogeneous field. There are at least
two practical areas which demand lightweight cryptography, which have entirely
different requirements:
• Crypto for Low Power Devices: battery-powered devices need crypto that
requires little energy per cryptographic computation. Energy-harvesting de-
vices need crypto that requires little power for cryptographic operations,
while still achieving a certain throughput.
• Low Latency Encryption: this is required for implementing external memory
encryption (useful against reverse engineering and in DRM) in a transparent
way, i.e., without having to adapt the microprocessor architecture.
? The paper published in the proceedings of ESC’17 – Early Symmetric Crypto work-
shop, 2017.
• Small Size (gate count) Crypto: in the literature, the gate count (or the
”gate equivalence” from some hardware synthesis process) is often under-
stood as a benchmark for new ”lightweight” primitives. It allows to compare
different primitives (which one can be implemented with less gates?) and
challenges both primitive designers and cryptanalysts (how many gates do
you need to maintain a certain level of security?). However, during the dis-
cussion, no practical demand for extremely small symmetric primitives could
be identified. Perhaps, the design and analysis of extremely small symmetric
primitives is a nice intellectual challenge, but for practical purposes, more a
distraction from the important issues for lightweight symmetric crypto, such
as low power and low latency?
Standards/Correct Implementation: very often, successful attacks on crypto-
graphic implementations do not arise from failures of cryptography by itself, but
rather from seemingly silly implementation mistakes. E.g., the famous Heart-
bleed bug on OpenSSL was actually a simple buffer over-read error, from an
incorrect implementation of the TLS protocol. To what degree can cryptog-
raphers contribute to proper specifications and correct implementation of the
cryptography they propose?
Random Number Generators: building and evaluating random number gener-
ators does not strictly belong to the field of cryptography but is essential for
many protocols.
Secure Channel Protocol: in symmetric cryptographic research there has been a
shift from primitives (block ciphers, stream ciphers, ) to more elaborate functions
(authenticated encryption schemes). The next step up is secure channel protocols
that satisfy more involved security requirements (e.g., when two parties share a
symmetric key, how do they use is to secure a chat session between them?)
Post-Quantum Crypto: the impact of quantum computers on symmetric cryp-
tography is not completely understood yet. Beyond the Grover algorithms, there
exist ways to break symmetric schemes faster than with classical computers. The
challenge is to develop more quantum attacks and identify countermeasures.
Format-Preserving Encryption: although NIST proposed a standard for encryp-
tion over small domains, the concept is not fully understood (namely, there is
a big gap between the theory and practice when it comes to formalize security
and prove it). In addition to this, current standards only encrypt over domains
of form Z`, i.e. a string of ` elements of an alphabet Z. We should also construct
ciphers over a more structured domains.
Low Multiplication Complexity Crypto: this is about symmetric crypto with
minimal multiplicative size and depth. Such symmetric primitives could be useful
for multi-party computation (MPC), homomorphic encryption (HE), and zero-
knowledge proofs (ZK), where linear computations are very cheap compared to
non-linear operations.
Block Ciphers for White-box Crypto: design a cipher for which it would be easy
to produce white-box implementations (all white-box attempts for DES and AES
have been broken). Another direction is to design provably weak white-boxed
ciphers. This has been shown to be relatively easy, but doing it efficiently could
be a challenge. Also design of strong white-box cipher (equivalent to public key)
has been a long standing challenge.
Proofs of Work (PoW): design functions which are provably hard (high com-
putation and/or memory complexity) to evaluate. Such functions are useful in
crypto-currencies, client puzzles (DDOS prevention) or as a mitigation against
spam. Such functions are also closely related to hash functions used for password
hashing.
Alternatives to PoW: since PoW functions are seen as wasting energy, green
alternatives are always welcome. However these are typically protocols (proof-
of-storage, proof-of-stake, byzantine fault tolerance) and wouldn’t be in the realm
of cryptography.
Tweakable Block Ciphers: over several decades, block ciphers have been the main
workhorses of symmetric cryptography. Even cryptographic hash functions, such
as MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and the SHA-2, family are based on an internal block
cipher. One new primitive, challenging the ordinary block ciphers, are tweakable
block ciphers (TBC). While it may be more challenging to design a secure TBC
than a plain block cipher, and the TBC might be a little slower than the ordinary
block cipher, at the same level of security, however the additional ”tweak” input
provides the mode and protocol designers with much greater degrees of freedom.
This makes the primitive design and analysis of TBCs an important research
question, just as the design and analysis of modes for TBCs.
Primitives with Proofs (Reductions): the ”gold standard” for the design of asym-
metric cryptographic primitives is to provide a security proof. The proof is a
reduction, i.e., it shows that breaking the primitive is at least as hard as solving
a certain algorithmic problem, which is meaningful beyond the cryptographic
application. This is entirely different in symmetric crypto, where a primitive is
claimed to be secure, and, at best, proven to withstand known attack techniques
(differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, ...). Is it possible to design sym-
metric primitives with a security proof, similarly to asymmetric cryptography?
Of course, avoiding trivial PK to SK reductions or stream ciphers produced from
one-way function hard bits, ideally keeping the traditional symmetric cryptog-
raphy performance advantage – at least in part.
Primitives Exploiting PK-Hardware: on many platforms there are dedicated co-
processors to perform public key cryptography, such as a Montgomery multi-
plication unit. A block cipher (or permutation) using operations that can be
performed efficiently on such a unit can give very good security at high speed.

